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347 
UNDERREPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: WHY 
TURKEY SHOULD ABANDON EUROPE’S 
HIGHEST ELECTORAL THRESHOLD 
It is Election Day: you go to the polls, wait in line, and cast your ballot. 
You have been evaluating all the parties for months, and you are confident 
in the decision you have finally made. You vote for a party that is 
extremely popular in your corner of the country. Watching the returns, you 
see that your party is polling at around 45% in your province, easily 
defeating its competitors. Unfortunately, your party is not so popular 
nationally. To your dismay, you find out that your three representatives in 
the legislature combined for less than 23% of the vote in your province.  
This scenario was the unfortunate reality for many voters in the 
province of Şırnak during the 2002 national elections in Turkey.1 Since the 
current Turkish Constitution was introduced in 1982 following the 1980 
military coup,
2
 the electoral system has often faced criticism. The electoral 
threshold, which mandates that a political party must obtain at least 10% 
of the vote in a national election to be admitted to Parliament, has been a 
focal point of these criticisms and the subject of court cases in the Turkish 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as 
numerous legislative reform efforts.
3
 While the threshold has withstood 
many challenges, commentators have raised concerns about the 
threshold‘s effects of forming unrepresentative governments and keeping 
minority and regional parties out of the Grand National Assembly.
4
 As 
evidenced by the results of the 2002 election which disenfranchised 
approximately 45% of the nation‘s voters,5 these concerns are well-
founded, and this Note argues for Turkey to reform its election law to 
create a more democratic system. Recently, there has been a push in 
Turkey toward major constitutional reform,
6
 and commentators have 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Turkey Votes for New Constitution, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Nov. 8, 1982, at 6; see also 
Turkish PM Ousted in „Non-Violent‟ Military Coup, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 12, 1980, at 40.   
 3. In the European Court of Human Rights, see Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, App. No. 
10226/03, Grand Chamber Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2008), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.asp?action=html&documentId=837656&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C116DEA398649. For a discussion of a Turkish Constitutional Court case, 
see infra note 115. For discussion of reform efforts, see infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.   
 4. See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 44. 
 6. Göksel Bozkurt, Gov‟t Plans to Speed Up Constitutional Amendment Process, HÜRRIYET 
DAILY NEWS & ECON. REV., Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=gov8217t-
plans-to-speed-up-the-constitutional-process-2010-01-20. 
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suggested that reform to the electoral threshold should be included.
7
 A 
constitutional reform package submitted on March 30, 2010, by Turkey‘s 
majority party, AKP, did not include changes to the electoral threshold.
8
 
This reform package was adopted, without any mention of the electoral 
threshold, after a referendum on September 12, 2010 passed with 58% 
approval.
9
 
This Note suggests that a threshold of 5%, which is in line with 
European averages, would drastically reduce the amount of ―wasted‖ votes 
and would allow for representation of more viewpoints, including 
important regional and minority parties. Part I of this Note provides the 
context for the electoral threshold and an explanation of how it works. 
First, the parliamentary system is explained, as well as the concept of 
electoral thresholds. Second, the Turkish parliamentary system is 
explored, as well as the legal and historical basis for the threshold. Part II 
of this Note addresses Turkish electoral history since the implementation 
of the threshold. Part III of this Note examines the opposition to the 
threshold, both from within Turkey and from the international community. 
Part IV of this Note examines the European Court of Human Rights 
decision Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, which addresses the legality of the 
threshold under the European Convention on Human Rights. Part V 
provides a discussion of alternatives to the current threshold, including 
systems used in other European states, as well as alternatives proposed 
specifically to address the threshold in Turkey.  
 
 
 7. See Cüneyt Ülsever, Op-Ed., Civilian Tutelage or Democracy? (II), HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS 
& ECON. REV., Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=civilian-tutelage-or-
democracy-ii--2010-02-02. In an editorial about constitutional reform in Turkey, the author writes, 
―The 10 percent election threshold is not a constitutional issue directly, but unless it is lowered to, let‘s 
say, 5 percent to 6 percent, in order to allow Kurdish deputies to have an entry in Parliament, I cannot 
believe in the sincerity of the government‘s Kurdish initiative.‖ This demonstrates that the issue of the 
electoral threshold, in addition to concerning representative democracy, also indirectly affects the 
debate on minority rights and minority representation in government. 
 8. See Kurdish Politicians Slam BDP Opposition to Package, TODAY‘S ZAMAN, Apr. 29, 2010, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-208770-100-kurdish-politicians-slam-bdp-opposition-to-
package.html; see also Pinar Aydinli, Factbox—Turkey‟s Contentious Constitutional Reform Project, 
REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE62T36920100330. For a detailed 
explanation of the reforms that were included in the reform package, with the precise new language 
adopted by the constitution as a result of the reforms, see Law No. 5982 Amending Certain Provisions 
of the Constitution, Prime Ministry of Turkey (2010), available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas% 
C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_amendments.pdf (Secretariat General for European Affairs 
trans.). 
 9. Turkey Backs Constitutional Changes, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-europe-11278602. 
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The final section, Part VI, offers the author‘s recommendation that 
Turkey adopt a 5% threshold, and includes an explanation for that 
recommendation. 
I. PARLIAMENTARY PRINCIPLES AND THE TURKISH SYSTEM 
A. Basic Parliamentary Principles 
The majority of legislatures in Europe are elected by way of a 
proportional representation system.
10
 Unlike the plurality system 
employed in the United States, in which single-seat districts are won by 
candidates obtaining the highest share of votes, or the majority vote 
system employed in the United Kingdom,
11
 proportional representation 
systems seek to allocate legislative seats in multi-seat districts by 
correlating the allocation of seats with the result of the vote.
12
 Most 
modern democracies have adopted the proportional representation system 
of electing legislatures
13
 because it leads to results that are more 
representative of popular opinion than the plurality system.
14
 
 
 
 10.  
Currently, proportional systems are the most widely used in Europe. By way of example, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey have opted for one 
or other variant of proportional representation. There are also mixed systems containing 
various combinations of the two types of ballot (in Germany, Italy and Lithuania, for 
example). 
Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 62. 
 11.  
In majority vote systems the winner is the candidate or list of candidates obtaining the 
majority of the votes in the decisive round of voting. This type of ballot makes it possible to 
vote in governments with clear parliamentary majorities, but at the same time it militates 
against the representation of minority political parties. Thus, for example, in the United 
Kingdom the use over many decades of a single round of voting in a single-member majority-
vote system (―first past the post‖), combined with the existence of two dominant political 
parties, has had the effect of giving few seats to other parties in relation to the number of 
votes that they obtain. 
Id. ¶ 61. 
 12. For example, imagine State A in the United States has four Congressional seats, and thus four 
Congressional districts. Party A wins 75% of the vote in all four districts, whereas Party B wins 25% 
of the vote in all four districts. In this hypothetical election, Party A would win all four seats. In a 
proportional representation system, the State would be one district with four available seats, and Party 
A‘s 75% share of the vote would earn it three seats, while Party B‘s 25% share would earn it the 
remaining seat. 
 13. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, Proportional Representation, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
(3d ed. 2003). 
 14. See Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 61 (―[T]he aim of the proportional representation system is 
to ensure that the votes cast are reflected in a proportional number of seats. Proportional representation 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Some proportional representation systems utilize election thresholds. 
These thresholds generally achieve a greater degree of stability in the 
formation of governments in parliament.
15
 Many governments have 
considered these thresholds necessary because proportional representation 
can increase the difficulty of forming stable governments when a large 
number of parties are voted into the legislature.
16
 By ensuring that only 
parties achieving a certain percentage of the national vote are seated, 
thresholds can prevent severe fragmentation in parliament.
17
 Therefore, if 
a government set the election threshold at five percent, only parties polling 
at five percent or greater would be seated. The level at which the electoral 
threshold is set varies from state to state, and it can have a significant 
impact on the political landscape, with the conventional logic being that 
higher thresholds increase stability while decreasing representativeness.
18
 
B. The Turkish System 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly forms the national legislative 
body of the Republic of Turkey. It is a single chamber consisting of 550 
members, each elected for four years.
19
 Each of Turkey‘s eighty-one 
provinces is represented by at least one deputy, while more heavily 
populated provinces may be split up into multiple constituencies.
20
 Parties 
 
 
is generally considered to be the fairest system because it tends to reflect more closely the various 
political forces.‖). 
 15. As the ECHR noted in Yumak, 
In some proportional systems statutory thresholds are used to correct the negative effects of 
proportional voting, and in particular to ensure greater parliamentary stability. These 
thresholds, generally expressed as a percentage of the votes cast, are ‗limits, fixed or variable, 
defined in terms of the electoral result, which determine the share of a list or candidate in the 
distribution of seats.‘ 
Id. ¶ 63. 
 16. Id. ¶ 61 (―[T]he disadvantage of proportional representation is that it tends to lead to 
fragmentation among those seeking electoral support and thus makes it more difficult to establish 
stable parliamentary majorities.‖). 
 17. Id. ¶ 63.  
 18. ―A low threshold excludes only very small groupings, which makes it more difficult to form 
stable majorities, whereas in cases where the party system is highly fragmented a high threshold 
deprives many voters of representation.‖ Id. In essence, the decision of setting a threshold level 
constitutes a balance between stability and representativeness. There is reason to believe, however, 
that higher thresholds may not promote stability to the extent they are expected to. See infra notes 36–
39 and accompanying text. 
 19. FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH (SETA), TURKEY‘S ELECTIONS 
GENERAL FACTS (2011), available at http://www.setadc.org/pdfs/Turkey_Elections_Fact_Sheet_2011. 
pdf.  
 20. ―Provinces with from one to 18 MPs form a single constituency; those with from 19 to 35 
MPs are divided into two constituencies; Istanbul, which has more than 35 seats, is divided into three 
constituencies.‖ Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/5
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must obtain ten percent of the national vote in order to seat members in the 
Grand National Assembly.
21
 This threshold is established by Law No. 
2839, Section 33.
22
 For parties passing the ten percent threshold, seats are 
allocated using the D‘Hondt method of proportional representation, which 
is a widely used mathematical formula for allocating seats in proportional 
representation systems.
23
 
The current Turkish electoral system is a result of a bloodless military 
coup in 1980 that followed a period of volatility and violence.
24
 The 
Turkish military blamed the instability of the 1970s on the inability of the 
parties in parliament to form a stable government.
25
 No party was able to 
gain a majority in the legislature in either the 1973 or 1977 election. As a 
result, this period saw many changes in government, with one coalition 
 
 
 21. Id. ¶ 33. 
 22. Section 33 reads:  
In a general election parties may not win seats unless they obtain, nationally, more than 10% 
of the votes validly cast . . . . An independent candidate standing for election on the list of a 
political party may be elected only if the list of the party concerned obtains sufficient votes to 
take it over the 10% national threshold. 
Id. For an unofficial translation of Law No. 2839 by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, see http://www.legislationline. 
org/documents/id/6991 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).  
 23. Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 34 (―In allocating seats the D‘Hondt system of proportional 
representation is used. That method—under which the votes cast for each list are first divided by a 
series of whole numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.) and seats then allocated to the lists which have the highest 
quotients—tends to favour the majority party.‖). See also Ricardo Zimbron, The Unappreciated 
Margin: Turkish Electoral Politics Before the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 
ONLINE 10, 13 & n.8 (2007), www.harvardilj.org/attach.php?id=127. Zimbron describes the D‘Hondt 
method in this way: 
 Once all votes have been cast and tallied, the party‘s total number of votes is divided by a 
denominator that increases as the party gains more seats. The formula for the quotient is 
X/(Y+1), where X is the number of votes received by the party, and Y is the number of seats 
that have been allocated to that party thus far. Whichever party has the highest quotient each 
time gets the next seat allocated. This process is repeated until all seats have been allocated. 
Id. at 13 n.8. 
 24.  
 On Sept. 12, 1980, the senior command of the army led by General Kenan Evren, carried 
out a bloodless coup. The action followed a resurgence of street fighting between leftists and 
nationalists. Leading politicians were arrested, and parliament, political parties, and trade 
unions were dissolved. A provisional constitution that gave almost unlimited power to 
military commanders was implemented. 
FACTBOX—Coups in Turkey over Last 50 Years, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSLR289039. 
 25. Ergun Özbudun, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 19, 35 (Tuğrul 
Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 2005) (―This [ten percent threshold] is designed to prevent the 
proliferation of political parties and the excessive fragmentation of the party system, which, in the 
opinion of the National Security Council and the Consultative Assembly, contributed significantly to 
the political crisis in the 1970s.‖). See infra note 126 for information on Dr. Özbudun‘s participation in 
efforts to reform the threshold. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dissolving and being replaced by another.
26
 It was this instability that 
prompted the military to include an electoral threshold in the Turkish 
system.
27
 
Turkey‘s electoral threshold is the highest amongst European 
democracies.
28
 The average threshold in Europe (excluding Turkey) is 
4.6%, and of the twenty-four countries in Europe that have thresholds, 
nineteen have thresholds of 5% or lower.
29
 The five countries that have 
thresholds higher than five percent are Turkey (10%), Liechtenstein (8%), 
the Russian Federation and Georgia (7%), and Moldova (6%).
30
 All other 
states either employ the threshold system with thresholds of five percent or 
lower,
31
 or they do not use thresholds at all.
32
 In addition, many states 
 
 
 26.  
[I]n the elections of 1973 and 1977 the main political movements were unable to establish 
stable governments, although they had wide electoral support. That period of government 
instability was marked by the formation of one coalition after another, each made fragile by 
the disproportionate influence of the small parties on government policy. 
Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 44. 
 27. Commentators have suggested that the military also sought the threshold as a means to 
discourage representation of parties except those in the center of the political sphere.  
The architects of the September 12 regime desired to construct a political sphere with the 
state at its center. This project reflected a political conception that perceived the state as the 
center and the society as the periphery. The different wings of politics, its left and its right, 
were to be determined according to this center. With this aim in view, it was stipulated that 
political parties would conform to a single type in their establishment and operation, that 
organic ties between political parties and other social organizations would be prevented by 
means of a series of prohibitions, and that the clustering of votes around a few central parties 
would be made obligatory by means of the 10 percent threshold for representation in the 
parliament.  
Ahmet Insel, The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, 102 S. ATLANTIC Q. 293, 294 (2003). 
If this was part of the military‘s motivation in drafting the new constitution, the decision to include a 
threshold shows that the military weighed stability as a far more important consideration than 
representativeness. 
 28. Zimbron, supra note 23, at 17. 
 29. Id. at 17–18.  
 30. Id. at 18. 
 31. EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH & DOCUMENTATION, ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW (Simon McGee ed., 2000), https://ecprd.secure.europarl.europa. 
eu/ecprd/getfile.do;jsessionid=155220412B626127585647C5A9F23683?id=5063. Six states have 
thresholds of 5%; thirteen states have thresholds lower than 5%. For example, Austria‘s threshold is 
4%, Denmark‘s is 2%, Italy has a 4% threshold for the 155 lower house seats elected nationally using 
a proportional representation system (other Lower House seats are elected using a plurality system and 
Upper House seats use proportional representation without a national threshold), Sweden has a 4% 
threshold, Romania has a 3% threshold, and Albania has a 2% threshold. Netherlands allocates one 
seat in their legislature for every 0.67% of the vote a party receives, allocating the remainder according 
to the D‘Hondt method. Thus, any party to receive at 0.67% of the vote would be assured 
representation. A 5% threshold is used in Germany, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Croatia. Note that the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania all allow 
thresholds to be increased to higher levels for coalitions. This actually functions to decrease the barrier 
created by the threshold, however, as parties who would not reach the threshold on their own may 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/5
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attempt to ―broaden participation‖ with exceptions to the threshold 
requirement,
33
 while Turkey does not.
34
  
II. TURKISH ELECTORAL HISTORY 
Since the threshold became law, Turkish elections have consistently 
disenfranchised a significant percentage of voters. In most of these 
elections a significant portion of the electorate voted for parties that did 
not pass the ten percent threshold.
35
 Of the eight elections since the coup, 
three produced coalition governments and five yielded single-party 
governments.
36
 Prior to the coup, proportional representation without a 
threshold had been used since 1960.
37
 In the four elections in that period, 
two resulted in coalition governments and the other two resulted in single-
 
 
combine to form a coalition of multiple parties so that they can pass the higher threshold. In this way, 
three parties polling at 3% in Poland, who would not be able to pass Poland‘s 5% threshold, could 
combine their efforts and pass the 8% coalition threshold. Though the source was published in 2000, 
all the preceding thresholds have remained the same. Since then, Ukraine lowered its threshold from 
4% to 3% and Moldova raised its threshold from 4% to 5%. See Country Profile: Ukraine, ELECTION 
GUIDE, Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=223 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); 
Country Profile: Moldova, ELECTION GUIDE, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.electionguide.org/country.php? 
ID=142 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 32. Id. Countries that do not utilize thresholds include Cyprus, Belgium, Finland, and Portugal. 
 33.  
Seven states (Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, and Serbia) have 
countermeasures in place to broaden participation. Germany and Poland for example both 
operate a 5% national threshold but candidates may also be elected by direct mandate to the 
German Bundestag, and in the Polish system ethnic minority parties do not have to surpass 
the threshold. 
Zimbron, supra note 23, at 18. 
 34. Id. at 17. 
 35. Id. at 18. In 1987, 19.4% of the electorate (about 4.5 million votes) were not represented in 
parliament. Subsequently, during the 1991 election cycle, only 0.5% of voters (approximately 
180,000) were unrepresented in parliament, the lowest disenfranchisement rate since the institution of 
the threshold. In 1995, 14% of the electorate (about 4 million votes) were not represented in 
parliament. In 1999, 18.3% of the electorate (about 6 million votes) were not represented in 
parliament. Id. 
 36. Id. at 15. Coalition governments were formed in 1991, 1995, and 1999. Single-party 
governments were formed in 1983, 1987, 2002, 2007, and 2011. Id. For a description of the results of 
the 2007 election, see Turkey Re-elects Governing Party, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2007, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/6910444.stm. For a description of results of the 2011 election, see Turkey Ruling 
Party Wins Election with Reduced Majority, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-13740147. 
 37. Id. at 13–14 (―The plurality formula was abandoned [after the 1960 coup] in favour of a 
proportional representation system based on D‘Hondt‘s largest average formula with a district 
quota. . . . [T]he proportional representation system adopted in 1960 did not have a threshold imposed 
on it . . . . [That system] was broadly kept in place until the military coup that occurred in September 
1980.‖). 
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party governments.
38
 These results suggest that Turkey‘s electoral 
threshold has not made elections significantly more likely to produce 
single-party governments, which are regarded as more stable.
39
 
A. The 2002 National Elections 
The 2002 national elections demonstrated that the 10% threshold can 
produce unrepresentative election returns in the Grand National Assembly. 
While eighteen parties participated in the elections, only two passed the 
threshold.
40
 The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 363 seats, 
accounting for 66% of the seats in Parliament, despite only polling at 
34.26% of the national vote.
41
 The Republican People‘s Party (CHP) won 
178 seats, accounting for 33% of the seats in Parliament, despite only 
polling at 19.4% of the national vote.
42
 Several other parties polled 
between 5% and 9.5% of the vote, but were not awarded seats in 
Parliament because they failed to pass the national threshold.
43
  
The 2002 election is widely considered the least representative in 
Turkey‘s history, as approximately 45% of voters cast their ballots for 
parties who did not win a single seat in Parliament.
44
 Numerous factors 
have been posited as explanations for the unusually high fragmentation of 
the vote, with so many voters casting their ballots for parties polling under 
10%.
45
 Regardless of which explanations hold true, the results would have 
 
 
 38. Id. at 14. Coalition governments were formed in 1973 and 1977. Single-party governments 
were formed in 1965 and 1969. Id. 
 39. Id. at 15 (―Looking at the electoral system from the perspective of its capacity to produce 
single-party majorities, it is apparent that the results produced after the imposition of Electoral Law 
No. 2839 are not too dissimilar to the ones produced in the previous system.‖). 
 40. Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 17. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. ¶ 18. The True Path Party (DYP) polled at 9.54%, the National Action Party (MHP) 
polled at 8.36%, the Young Party (GP) polled at 7.25%, the Democratic People‘s Party (DEHAP) 
polled at 6.22%, and the Motherland Party (ANAP) polled at 5.13%. Id. 
 44.  
The results of these elections were generally interpreted as a huge political upheaval. Not 
only did the proportion of the electorate not represented in parliament reach a record level in 
Turkey (approximately 45%) but in addition the abstention rate (22% of registered voters) 
exceeded 20% for the first time since 1980. As a result, the National Assembly which 
emerged from the elections was the least representative since 1946, the year in which a multi-
party system was first introduced. Moreover, for the first time since 1954, only two parties 
were represented in parliament. 
Id. ¶ 19. 
 45.  
To explain the National Assembly‘s unrepresentativity [sic], some commentators have 
referred to the cumulative effect of a number of factors over and above the existence of a high 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/5
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been far more representative if the threshold had been set at a more 
reasonable level.
46
 The end result of the elections was the formation of a 
government with the AKP holding an absolute majority, despite polling at 
less than 35% nationally.
47
 Thus, a party for which 65% of the population 
did not vote ruled as if majority-elected.
48
 A system where this is possible 
could lead to bizarre and undemocratic policies.
49
 
The province of Şırnak is a prime example of a failure to represent the 
voting populace in the 2002 election. There, DEHAP was the highest 
polling party at 45.95% but was not allocated any of the province‘s three 
seats because it did not poll at least 10% nationally.
50
 Two of the seats 
were allocated to the AKP, which polled at 14.05% in the province, and 
one seat was allocated to an independent candidate who polled at 9.69% of 
the provincial votes.
51
 Thus, the province of Şırnak was represented in the 
Grand National Assembly by three representatives who combined for less 
than 23% of the province‘s votes. 
B. The 2007 National Elections: Smaller Parties Circumvent The 
Electoral Threshold 
In 2007, some smaller parties found ways to circumvent the 10% 
threshold. The first was the ―independent strategy,‖ first employed by the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) which instructed its candidates to stand 
 
 
national threshold. For example, because of the protest vote phenomenon linked to the 
economic and political crisis, the five parties which had obtained seats in the 1999 
parliamentary elections—including the three which had formed the governing coalition 
between 1999 and 2002—were unable to reach the 10% threshold in 2002 and were 
accordingly deprived of representation in parliament. Similarly, electoral fragmentation had 
an effect on the results in that numerous attempts to form pre-electoral coalitions had come to 
nothing. 
Id. ¶ 20. 
 46. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 47. Id. ¶¶ 21, 17. 
 48. CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34039, TURKEY‘S 2007 ELECTIONS: 
CRISIS OF IDENTITY AND POWER 9 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34039. 
pdf (―AKP won only 34% of the vote in 2002, but it governed as if it had won a majority and did not 
reach out to the opposition.‖). 
 49. See id. at 10 (―[For example,] Erdoğan called for adultery to be criminalized until European 
officials shouted him down and he questioned the right of the European Court of Human Rights, 
whose jurisdiction Turkey accepts, instead of religious scholars (ulema) to judge the head scarf 
issue.‖). 
 50.  ―The results of the elections of 3 November 2002 in the province of Şırnak gave the DEHAP 
list 47,449 of the 103,111 votes cast, a score of about 45.95%. However, as the party had not 
succeeded in passing the national threshold of 10%, the applicants were not elected.‖ Yumak, App. No. 
10226/03, ¶ 16. 
 51. Id. 
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as independents so that they were not subject to the threshold.
52
 After 
winning their elections as independents, the MPs then joined the DTP 
once again.
53
 This strategy was used by some candidates outside the DTP 
as well.
54
 The second strategy involved a party‘s candidates joining the list 
of a larger party, then leaving that party and rejoining the old party after 
being elected to Parliament.
55
 Unfortunately, both of these strategies have 
some disadvantages. 
Electoral law in Turkey, while allowing independent candidates to run 
without any threshold limitation, carries some restrictions that limit the 
viability of small party candidates. Law Number 2839 Section 21(2) 
requires independent candidates to deposit a sum of money equal to the 
gross monthly salary of a civil servant of the highest rank, while Section 
41(1) of that law stipulates that the candidate will lose that deposit if he 
does not obtain enough votes to win a seat.
56
 The combination of these two 
sections has the effect of limiting the strategy to only the most serious of 
independent candidates and to those who are popular enough in a given 
province to outpoll large national parties. In addition, Turkish residents 
abroad are not able to vote for independent candidates, and unlike major 
political parties, independent candidates are not allotted television and 
radio time for their campaigns.
57
 
 
 
 52. ―The Party for a Democratic Society (DTP, pro-Kurdish, left-leaning) presented its 
candidates as independents using the label ‗A thousand hopes‘; it also supported certain left-wing 
Turkish candidates.‖ Id. ¶ 23. 
 53. Id. ¶ 25 (―In the elections of 22 July 2007, 27 independent MPs were elected. In particular, 
more than twenty ‗Thousand hopes‘ candidates were elected after obtaining approximately 2.23% of 
the votes cast and joined the DTP after the elections.‖). 
 54. ―The independents also included a socialist MP (the former president of the ÖDP), a 
nationalist MP (the former president of the Great Union Party—BBP, nationalist) and a centrist MP 
(the former president of ANAP).‖ Id. 
 55. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. (―The Party of the Democratic Left (DSP) took part in the poll under the banner 
of the CHP, a rival party, and by that means managed to win 13 seats . . . . [T]he 13 MPs . . . 
subsequently resigned from the CHP and went back to the DSP, their original party.‖). 
 56. Section 21(2) reads:  
Persons wishing to stand as independent candidates shall deposit with the competent Treasury 
authorities, as a guarantee, a sum equal to the gross monthly salary of a civil servant of the 
highest rank, and shall place a receipt for payment of that sum in the file presenting their 
candidature in the parliamentary election.  
Id. ¶ 35. Section 41(1) reads, ―[I]f, in a parliamentary election, an independent candidate has not 
obtained sufficient votes to win a seat, the sum deposited as a guarantee shall be forfeited to the 
Treasury.‖ Id. 
 57.  
Under the relevant legislation the name of independent candidates is not printed on the voting 
slips provided near the Turkish borders. That means that Turkish electors resident abroad may 
vote only for a political party using the ballot boxes placed at border crossing-points or large  
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The method of smaller parties joining the lists of larger parties also has 
drawbacks.
58
 Democracy depends upon competition for legislative 
representation between differing opinions, which are generally compiled 
in the form of opposing parties.
59
 The independence of a political party is 
undermined when it must rely on another to gain representation.
60
 Smaller 
parties must gain approval of larger parties in order to be included in their 
lists.
61
 The strategy of allowing smaller parties to join the lists of larger 
parties also depends upon the whims of the larger parties, and this strategy 
may not be available in future elections.
62
 Moreover, the use of these 
tactics to circumvent the election threshold runs counter to the threshold‘s 
goal of ensuring government stability.
63
 
In the 2011 election, the threshold featured prominently in the 
strategies of political parties. Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that 
AKP‘s goal was to obtain a ―super-majority‖ in the General Assembly, so 
they could unilaterally pass a new constitution.
64
 This would require a 
two-thirds majority, meaning AKP would need to win 367 of the 550 
seats.
65
 Likely realizing it could hardly hope to obtain two-thirds of the 
national vote, AKP sought to take votes from the nationalist MHP, which 
was the third largest party in the Grand National Assembly following the 
 
 
airports. Similarly, whereas political parties have time allocated on television and radio for 
electioneering broadcasts, independent candidates do not. 
Id. ¶ 38. 
 58. Id. ¶ 4 (Tulkens, J., Vajić, J., Jaeger, J., and Šikuta, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court did not 
consider the detrimental effect of these techniques on the party system as such when parties have to 
seek and find protection from other parties for the purpose of slipping through the 10% threshold.‖). 
 59. Id. (―In themselves, parties represent and unite different currents of thought.‖). 
 60. Id. (―Any interference with their independent participation in elections curtails the free 
expression of the opinion of the people—whether the interference is direct or indirect.‖).  
 61.  
To achieve such alliances, candidates from one party have to be accepted, even approved of 
by another party, which undermines the independence of parties especially in respect of their 
representatives standing as candidates on other parties' lists. In other words, it means playing 
―hide and seek‖ with voters, thus undermining essential democratic principles. 
Id. 
 62.  
[T]hese correctives and safeguards are exclusively the result of political considerations and 
agreements and there can be no certainty that they will remain available in the future. These 
practices, which are in any case themselves contrary to the Turkish Constitution and Turkish 
electoral legislation (section 16 of Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National 
Assembly), may be changed and disappear from one day to the next. 
Id. 
 63. Id. (―[T]he Court itself acknowledges that these ‗stratagems‘ run counter to the legitimate 
aim of fixing such a high threshold, namely preventing parliamentary fragmentation.‖). 
 64. Jürgen Gottschlich, Erdogan Falls Short of Goal in Turkish Elections, SPIEGEL ONLINE, June 
13, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,768175,00.html. 
 65. Id. 
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2007 election.
66
 AKP‘s goal was to reduce MHP‘s share of the vote to 
under ten percent, and take a share of those seats. The campaign saw AKP 
taking a harder line on the Kurdish issue, and campaigning harder against 
MHP than CHP, its main opposition.
67
 At one point in the campaign, six 
senior members of MHP resigned after secretly taped sex videos were 
released online.
68
 One of those MHP politicians publically claimed the 
videos had been a trap set by Erdoğan and AKP.69 AKP‘s efforts failed, 
and MHP ended up with 13% of the vote.
70
 AKP won almost 50% of the 
vote and CHP won about 26% of the vote.
71
 This left AKP with 326 seats, 
well short of their goal, but still a comfortable majority.
72
 
III. OPPOSITION TO THE THRESHOLD 
Many groups within Turkey have called for the reform of the electoral 
system. In 2008, the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) presented a 
proposal to Parliament to reduce the threshold from 10% to 3%.
73
 In 2009, 
in response to dissatisfaction with the 10% threshold, the ruling AKP 
proposed a new election system under which a portion of the deputies 
elected to the Grand National Assembly would not be subject to the 
threshold.
74
 The AKP has also publicly supported lowering the election 
threshold to 7% or even 5%.
75
 These reform efforts were not the first. In 
2002, three of the parties in the Grand National Assembly attempted, in 
vain, to call an emergency meeting to reduce the threshold to 5% before 
the 2002 national elections.
76
 In addition to political opposition, the high 
 
 
 66. Turkey Opposition Politicians Quit in Sex Video Scandal, BBC NEWS, May 21, 2011, http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13484990. 
 67. Id.; see also Dorian Jones, Turkey: AKP Faces Growing Challenge from Kurdish Unrest, 
EURASIANET.ORG, May 19, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63520. 
 68. Turkey Opposition Politicians Quit, supra note 66. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Gottschlich, supra note 64. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Turkey‟s DTP Proposes to Reduce Election Threshold, HÜRRIYET, July 16, 2008, http:// 
arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=9452687.  
 74. Ercan Yavuz, Gov‟t to Propose New System of Deputy Election for Fair Representation, 
TODAY‘S ZAMAN, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link 
=154042&bolum=100.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Parties Likely to Demand Emergency Meeting For Threshold Today, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 17, 2002, 2002 WLNR 7615710 (Westlaw). The effort was led by the New Turkey Party (YTP) 
and was supported by the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Saadet Party (SP). At the time, the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the True Path Party 
(DYP) opposed the measure. Id. The leader of the YTP claimed that all parties in parliament agreed 
that the ten percent threshold was too high. Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey and leader of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] TURKEY‘S ELECTORAL THRESHOLD 359 
 
 
 
 
threshold has received criticism from Turkish scholars and prominent 
business leaders. The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen‘s 
Association (TÜSIAD) has consistently criticized the threshold,
77
 and 
Mustafa Koç, a prominent business leader speaking on behalf of TÜSIAD, 
called for the 10% threshold to be lowered in order to improve the fairness 
of representation in Parliament.
78
 Turkish-American scholar Zeyno 
Baran
79
 has criticized the threshold as contributing to the ―combative, 
zero-sum political culture that typifies Turkey today.‖80 She has suggested 
that lowering the threshold to 5% or 7% would serve to erode this political 
culture and encourage consensus building.
81
 The president of Turkey has 
even suggested that the high threshold is no longer necessary for political 
stability and could be reduced.
82
  
In addition to opposition within the country, Turkey‘s high threshold 
has received criticism from other European countries and scholars. In 
2007, the Council of Europe passed a resolution recommending that 
 
 
Democratic Left Party (DSP), agreed that the threshold was too high but said it was wrong to amend 
the law just a month and a half before the elections. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., BÜLENT TANOR, TURKISH INDUSTRIALISTS‘ & BUSINESSMEN‘S ASS‘N, 
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATISATION IN TURKEY: PROGRESS REPORT 2001—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
16 (2001), http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/DEMOCSUMMARY.PDF (recommending, inter 
alia, that the electoral threshold be lowered to 5%); see also Sahin Alpay, Opinion Paper, Elections of 
November 3: A Victory for Turkish Democracy, TURKISH INDUSTRIALISTS‘ & BUSINESSMEN‘S ASS‘N, 
Nov. 7, 2002, at 1 http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/SAHIN%20ALPAY%20-%20ELECTIO 
NS.PDF (calling the Turkish election system perhaps the worst in the world because it is ―a system 
based on the principle of proportional representation with a 10 percent threshold which produces 
neither stable government nor fair representation‖). 
 78. Lower Election Threshold, Says Business Boss, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS & ECON. REV., Oct. 
1, 2009, http://web.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=lower-election-threshold-says-business-boss-2009 
-10-01 (―‗If we are to speak about a democratic move, ways must be explored to lower the threshold 
and widen political representation in Parliament,‘ said Mustafa Koç, head of a consultation committee 
with the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, or TÜSİAD.‖). 
 79. Baran‘s biography is available at http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=staff_ 
bio&eid=BaranZeyno (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 80. Zeyno Baran, Turkey Divided, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 63 (2008), available at http://muse.jhu. 
edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v019/19.1baran.html. 
 81. Id.  
 82.  
Mr. Gül explained that the 10% threshold had been introduced to remedy the instability of 
previous years, in which there had been a large number of coalition governments in close 
succession. The threshold did not prevent independent candidates from standing. In the latest 
parliamentary elections, in July 2007, voter turnout had been 85%, which showed how 
representative parliament was. Now that political stability had been restored the 10% 
threshold could be reconsidered. 
Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 60. 
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electoral thresholds not exceed 3%.
83
 The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has also specifically requested that Turkey lower its 
10% threshold.
84
 Minority Rights International, a U.K.-based non-
governmental organization, has blamed the 10% threshold for preventing 
minority parties from being elected to parliament.
85
 A 2007 report from 
the group points out that pro-Kurdish parties have consistently received 
the highest percentage of votes in many areas in eastern and southeastern 
Turkey, but have failed to surpass the national 10% threshold.
86
 The 
organization went on to suggest that Turkey reduce its threshold to 5%.
87
  
 
 
 83.  
In well-established democracies, there should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the 
parliamentary elections. It should thus be possible to express a maximum number of opinions. 
Excluding numerous groups of people from the right to be represented is detrimental to a 
democratic system. In well-established democracies, a balance has to be found between fair 
representation of views in the community and effectiveness in parliament and government. 
EUR. PARL. ASS., State of Human Rights and Democracy in Europe, Res. 1547, ¶ 58 (2007), available 
at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES1547.htm; see also 
EUR. PARL. ASS., State of Human Rights and Democracy in Europe, Recommendation 1791, ¶ 17.10 
(2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/erec1791.htm 
(calling on member states to ―consider decreasing thresholds over 3% for parliamentary elections and 
to consider the balance between fair representation and effectiveness in parliament and government.‖). 
 84. EUR. PARL. ASS., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Turkey, Res. 1380, ¶¶ 6, 
23(ii) (2004), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1380.htm. 
Paragraph 6 of the resolution reads ―requiring parties to win at least 10% of the votes cast nationally 
before they can be represented in parliament is excessive,‖ and paragraph 23(ii) urges Turkey to 
―amend the electoral code to lower the 10% threshold.‖ Id.; see also EUR. PARL. ASS., Observation of 
the Parliamentary Elections in Turkey (22 July 2007), ¶ 59, Doc. No. 11367 (2007), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/workingdocs/doc07/edoc11367.pdf (―[T]he Rapporteur believes 
that Turkey could do more in terms of organising even better elections that would guarantee a 
genuinely representative Parliament. The 10% threshold requirement could be lowered, in accordance 
with Assembly Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547(2007) [sic]. The fact that the new Parliament 
elected on 22 July 2007 is far more representative than the outgoing Parliament representing about 90 
percent of the opinions of the electorate, is due to the fact that three instead of two parties are 
represented and to the ploy of opposition parties to launch party-sponsored independent candidates and 
not to any steps taken by the Turkish authorities themselves.‖). 
 85. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, A QUEST FOR EQUALITY: MINORITIES IN 
TURKEY 3 (2007). 
 86.  
The 10 per cent national electoral threshold is a considerable obstacle to the representation of 
minorities in the national parliament. It is particularly detrimental for the pro-Kurdish parties, 
who have repeatedly failed to surpass the national threshold, despite having received the 
highest percentage of votes in Turkey‘s eastern and south-eastern regions populated 
predominantly by the Kurds. 
Id. at 25. 
 87. Id. at 35 (―The national threshold should be lowered to 5 per cent to conform with European 
standards and to ensure justice in representation.‖). While many possible reforms to the threshold may 
exist, there is an insistence that European standards should guide reform. As European standards 
suggest no threshold should be higher than 5%, any reform should at least include a reduction in the 
threshold to this level. For a discussion of European standards, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR 
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), REPORT: ON THRESHOLDS AND OTHER 
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Despite the call for reform within Turkey and the echo of these 
concerns in Europe, the threshold remains unaltered. And despite 
previously voicing support for reducing the threshold, the AKP failed to 
address the issue when it submitted a sweeping constitutional reform 
package to Parliament.
88
 Soon after the introduction of the reform 
package, Hakkı Suha Okay, the deputy chairman of the CHP, submitted a 
proposal that the threshold be lowered to 7%, hoping to pass the proposal 
so that it would be in effect for the 2011 elections.
89
 However, the 
proposal was rejected by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the 
AKP, meaning the 10% threshold remained in effect for the 2011 
elections.
90
 
IV. YUMAK AND SADAK V. TURKEY 
Following the 2002 parliamentary elections, two candidates from 
Şırnak, both members of the People‘s Democratic Party (DEHAP), filed a 
complaint against the Turkish government in the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR).
91
 The applicants alleged that the imposition of the 
high electoral threshold ―interfered with the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature.‖92 The applicants relied on 
Article 3 of Protocol Number 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which reads, ―The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which 
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the legislature.‖93 
 
 
FEATURES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS WHICH BAR PARTIES FROM ACCESS TO PARLIAMENT (II) 12 
(2010), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)007-e.pdf. 
 88. Liam Hardy, Turkey Must Focus Itself on Constitutional Reform, THE DAILY STAR, July 19, 
2010 (LEXIS). 
 89. Turkish Opposition Bids to Lower „Unfair‟ Election Threshold, EURACTIV, July 16, 2010, 
available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-bids-lower-unfair-election-
threshold-news-496427. Because changes to electoral law cannot be made in the year preceding 
elections, the proposal would have had to pass prior to July 22, 2010. Id. 
 90. See Göksel Bozkurt & İzgi Güngör, „Turkey‟s Terror Cannot Be Solved with Guns Alone,‟ 
CHP Chief Says, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS & ECON. REV., July 25, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdaily 
news.com/n.php?n=terror-cannot-be-solved-with-guns-alone-chp-chief-says-2010-07-25; see also 
Main Opposition Leader: “We Proposed Re-Arrangement of Election Threshold”, J. TURKISH WKLY., 
July 15, 2010, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/104559/main-opposition-leader-quot-we-proposed-
re-arrangement-of-election-threshold-quot-.html. 
 91. See Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶¶ 1, 11, 14. 
 92. Id. ¶ 74. 
 93. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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The applicants alleged that the 10% threshold deprived many voters the 
expression of their choice of political representation.
94
 First, the applicants 
attacked the argument that the threshold serves the legitimate aim of 
ensuring governmental stability by pointing out that elections since the 
threshold had been established were no more likely to produce single-
party governments.
95
 Second, they argued that coalition governments are 
not necessarily less stable than single-party governments.
96
 Finally, the 
applicants argued that a system which severely handicaps parties 
representing a particular group or region runs counter to the aims of 
democracy.
97
 
The government countered that the threshold was protected because it 
was the result of a legitimate governmental aim, arguing that the threshold 
was put in place to prevent ―excessive fragmentation‖ of parliament and 
thus ensure political stability.
98
 The government also argued that the 
loopholes in the law, which allowed independents to run without being 
subject to the threshold and allowed smaller parties to enter parliament by 
joining the list of larger parties, functioned as ―existing correctives‖ to 
 
 
 94. Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 77. 
 95. Id. ¶ 79 (―The applicants laid emphasis on the fact that two of the four elections in which 
proportional representation was used without recourse to the electoral threshold (those of 1965 and 
1969) had produced single-party governments; the other two (those of 1973 and 1977) had led to 
coalition governments.‖). 
 96. Id. ¶ 80 (―Moreover, though it was not excluded that lowering or abolishing the national 
electoral threshold would lead to a coalition government, such an outcome was not necessarily 
synonymous with governmental instability. Coalition governments were sometimes more stable than 
single-party governments.‖). 
 97.  
In the applicants‘ submission, one of the main aims of a democracy based on a system of 
elected parties was to ensure that political parties whose electorate was implanted wholly or 
mainly in a particular region could function and be elected freely, without restrictions, and 
that the electors who voted for them should be represented on an equal footing. 
Id. ¶ 89. 
 98.  
They submitted that the 10% threshold was calculated to ensure the country‘s political 
stability by preventing excessive fragmentation of the composition of parliament and to 
strengthen democracy and political parties by encouraging the latter to propose policies 
accepted more or less generally throughout the country. The threshold did not infringe the 
fundamental principles of democracy such as pluralism. On the contrary, facilitating the 
election of independent candidates by exempting them from the 10% threshold made it 
possible for pluralism to put down deep roots in society. In that connection, the Government 
emphasised that between 1961 and 1980, when Turkey did not apply any threshold, there had 
been twenty changes of government in nineteen years, whereas between 1983 and 2007, the 
period when the 10% threshold was in force, seven elections had produced three coalition 
governments and three single-party governments. These figures showed that the threshold had 
positive effects on governmental stability. 
Id. ¶ 93. 
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prevent the effects of the 2002 elections from recurring.
99
 This was the 
foundation of the government‘s main argument—that the 2007 elections 
proved the system worked.
100
 
Though not argued in Yumak, other commentators, both before and 
after this case, have supported higher thresholds as a means of 
discouraging votes for extremist parties. In a 1996 study, Robert Jackman 
and Karin Volpert analyzed the conditions that influence the success of 
extreme right parties, and found that increasing electoral thresholds dilutes 
support for these parties.
101
 This makes intuitive sense—extremist parties 
generally operate on the fringe of national politics, so making it more 
difficult to elect them would make voters less likely to even vote for them. 
In Turkey, the high threshold could be aimed at preventing the success of 
extreme-religious parties,
102
 extreme-right nationalist parties (such as the 
 
 
 99.  
The two possibilities which had been put into practice in the 2007 elections—standing as an 
independent candidate or collaborating with another party with a view to being elected from 
its lists—were very concrete examples of the existing correctives. Recourse to these 
correctives in the latest elections had made it possible to offer 85% of all voters some 
representation in parliament. The Government submitted that if these options had been used 
in 2002, the results would have been similar. 
Id. ¶ 98. 
 100.  
As regards the results of the 2007 poll, given that 85% of all voters in the country were now 
represented in parliament, the Government considered that the principle of fair representation 
had been respected satisfactorily. Furthermore, in the smaller provinces, particularly those 
where most of the DTP's independent candidates were standing on 22 July 2007, the chances 
of being elected were higher than in larger provinces or constituencies. For example, to be 
elected in the first Istanbul constituency a candidate had to obtain about 111,750 votes, 
whereas in Hakkari province (south-eastern Turkey) 34,000 were needed. The distribution of 
seats among the provinces was manifestly more favourable to the smaller provinces, which 
made it possible to ensure that the principle of fair representation was respected. 
Id. ¶ 101. 
 101. Matt Golder, Note, Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A 
Correction, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 525, 527 (2003).  
[Jackman and Volpert] also predict that higher electoral thresholds ‗dampen the prospects for 
smaller parties of the extreme right‘. This is because voters do not want to waste their vote. 
Their decision to include an interaction term between the effective threshold and the effective 
number of parties is based on Lijphart‘s conclusion that disproportionality and multi-partism 
are ‗loosely inter-dependent‘. They anticipate that ‗the dampening effect of disproportionality 
on extreme right support will increase with multi-partism, while the positive effect of multi-
partism diminishes with rising disproportionality‘. 
Id. at 527 (citations omitted). 
 102. Turkey has long been a secular republic, and secularists have deep-rooted fears of Islamists 
and political Islam. Secularists in Turkey fear that the AKP, the governing party since the 2002 
elections, embraces an Islamist agenda. For further information about secularists, Islamists, and the 
AKP see Baran, supra note 80. 
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MHP),
103
 or Kurdish parties allegedly tied to the PKK,
104
 a separatist 
terrorist organization.
105
 However, a recent study has found that, in some 
circumstances, higher thresholds have increased support levels for 
extreme right parties.
106
 In Turkey, the types of parties the threshold might 
potentially seek to repress have all had some success in politics, especially 
the far-right MHP, which polled at 14% in the 2007 elections.
107
 The 
argument that the threshold is necessary to prevent extremist parties from 
entering the legislature is also flawed because the constitution already has 
a mechanism for excluding parties that do not pass constitutional 
muster,
108
 and it assumes an arbitrary level of popularity (in this case 10%) 
at which views become legitimate as opposed to extreme.
109
  
 
 
 103.  
―Our country is about to be broken into pieces and we need to prevent it,‖ said a textile 
worker, wearing a button-down black shirt in the style of Italian fascists that is typical of the 
attire worn by supporters of the Nationalist Action Party, known by initials in Turkish, MHP. 
―There are three things—my country, my flag, my prayer. I can't let anyone touch any of 
them.‖ 
Sabrina Tavernise, Hard-liners Make Gains in Turkey Election, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23iht-turkey.5.6794446.html. 
 104. Turkish Top Court Bans Pro-Kurdish Party, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/europe/8408903.stm (―The 11 judges in Turkey's Constitutional Court ruled that the DTP had 
become a ‗focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation‘, 
court president Hasim Kilic told reporters.‖); see also Ayşe Karabat, They Made It to Parliament but 
Tough Job Awaits DTP‟s Women, TODAY‘S ZAMAN, July 25, 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=117588 (―The DTP‘s İstanbul deputy, Sebahat Tuncel, is under 
arrest and being tried on charges of being a member of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers‘ Party 
(PKK)‖); EU Report: DTP Is Connected to PKK „In a Way,‟ WORLD BULLETIN, Aug. 6, 2007, http:// 
www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=8226.  
 105. Turkish Top Court Bans Pro-Kurdish Party, supra note 104 (―The PKK is listed as a terrorist 
organisation by Turkey, the EU and the US‖). 
 106.  
Figure 1 shows that electoral thresholds have no effect on extreme right parties when the 
effective number of parties ranges between 2.3 and 3.1. About one third of the observations 
fall in this range. The figure also implies that increases in electoral thresholds help extreme 
right parties when there are few parties. This is at odds with Jackman and Volpert‘s 
theoretical argument that raising electoral thresholds should decrease the electoral support of 
extreme right parties. If their argument were correct, then one would expect the conditional 
coefficient for electoral thresholds always to be negative. This is not the case here. 
Golder, supra note 101, at 530 (footnote omitted). 
 107. Tavernise, supra note 103. 
 108. In Turkey, the Constitution allows the Courts to dissolve some political parties. ―The 
decision to dissolve a political party permanently owing to activities violating the provisions of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 68 may be rendered only when the Constitutional Court determines that the 
party in question has become a centre for the execution of such activities.‖ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasasi [Constitution] art. 69. para. 1 (Turk.), translated in World Constitutions Illustrated: Turkey 
(Jefri J. Ruchti ed., Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turk. trans., 2010) (HeinOnline). The 
standard for dissolving a political party is articulated by Article 68 of the Constitution.  
The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in 
conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and 
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The court ultimately ruled for the government, upholding the 10% 
threshold.
110
 The court emphasized that under Article 3 of Protocol 
Number 1, Contracting States are given a ―wide margin of 
appreciation.‖111 The court found that the threshold served a legitimate 
aim
112
 and was proportional to this aim.
113
 In finding proportionality, the 
court pointed to the two loopholes that the government had argued were 
corrective measures to prevent the recurrence of the 2002 results.
114
 The 
court also gave weight to a Turkish Constitutional Court decision that 
upheld this threshold while acknowledging that not all thresholds would 
be constitutional.
115
 
Despite the court‘s decision that the Turkish government was within its 
rights in maintaining the 10% threshold, the court‘s language 
recommended the government reexamine the policy. The decision reads, 
―[T]he Court considers that in general a 10% electoral threshold appears 
 
 
nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the 
principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish 
class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.  
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi art. 68 para. 4. While this provision of the Constitution certainly 
should be scrutinized in and of itself, it does serve to nullify any concerns about possibility of allowing 
legislative access to less popular and harmfully extreme parties in the event that the threshold were 
lowered. This provision was recently used to ban the pro-Kurdish DTP. Turkish Court Bans pro-
Kurdish Party, supra note 104. 
 109. If the threshold is used to weed out extreme views, theoretically any political philosophy 
whose proponents poll under the threshold would be characterized as extreme, and any philosophy 
whose proponents surpass the threshold would be considered legitimate. In a democracy, all 
viewpoints should be represented in the legislature to the extent that they exist in the society, and the 
result should be a compromise based on the relative political power of these competing philosophies. 
 110. Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶¶ 147–48. 
 111. Id. ¶ 109(ii) (―The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is 
room for ‗implied limitations‘, and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in 
this sphere.‖). 
 112. Id. ¶ 125 (―[T]he Court agrees with the Chamber's finding that the interference in question 
had the legitimate aim of avoiding excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation and thus of 
strengthening governmental stability.‖). 
 113. Id. ¶¶ 132–46. To find proportionality, the Court compared the threshold to others in Europe, 
and decided that the threshold would be justified ―so long as the chosen system provides for conditions 
which will ensure the ‗free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.‘‖ Id. 
¶ 132. The Court then analyzed the safeguards in the Turkish electoral system and found that these 
safeguards were enough that the right guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 would be protected. 
Id. ¶¶ 133–46. 
 114.  
Consequently, the Court notes that the political parties affected by the high 10% threshold 
have managed in practice to develop strategies whereby they can attenuate some of its effects, 
even though such strategies also run counter to one of the threshold‘s declared aims, which is 
to avoid parliamentary fragmentation. 
Id. ¶ 143; see also id. ¶¶ 60, 125. 
 115. Id. ¶ 145. In its 1995 decision, the Constitutional Court upheld the national 10% threshold, 
but declared a 25% provincial threshold to be unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
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excessive,‖116 and ―it concurs with the organs of the Council of Europe, 
which have stressed the threshold‘s exceptionally high level and have 
recommended that it be lowered.‖117 Therefore, the court‘s decision should 
be read narrowly, implicating the limited jurisdiction of the court when 
dealing with member country election laws, and should not be construed 
as approving such a high electoral threshold in general. Even while 
affirming that the imposition of the threshold was within the government‘s 
rights, the court agreed with those who argued that the electoral system in 
Turkey should be reformed.
118
 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TEN PERCENT THRESHOLD 
One possible alternative to the 10% threshold is to maintain an 
electoral threshold at a lower level. A common proposal is reducing the 
10% threshold to 5%.
119
 This would put Turkey‘s threshold in line with the 
European average.
120
 Had a 5% threshold been in place during the 2002 
elections, the result would have been a much more representative 
parliament. In that election, 36.5% of votes cast were for parties that 
obtained over 5% of the national vote, but still fell short of the 10% 
threshold.
121
 A 5% electoral threshold would thus have lowered the 
percentage of unrepresented votes from 45% to less than 10%. Even a 
more modest reform, lowering the threshold to 7%, would have allowed 
three more parties into parliament, and an additional 25% of the votes cast 
would have been represented.
122
 
Turkey could also opt to eliminate the threshold requirement entirely. 
Prior to the 1980 coup, parliament was elected by a proportional 
representation system without any national threshold.
123
 The ratio of 
elections producing a single-party government as opposed to a coalition 
government was similar to the ratio under the current system.
124
 It can be 
 
 
 116. Id. ¶ 147. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. See supra notes 75, 76, and 81 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Yumak, App. No. 10226/03, ¶ 18. The True Path Party (DYP) polled at 9.54%, the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) polled at 8.36%, the Young Party (GP) polled at 7.25%, the 
People‘s Democratic Party (DEHAP) polled at 6.22%, and the Motherland Party (ANAP) polled at 
5.13%. These numbers add up to 36.5% of the national vote. Id. 
 122. See id. The DYP, MHP, and GP all polled above 7% (9.54%, 8.36%, and 7.25% 
respectively). Their share of the vote adds up to 25.15% of the national vote. Id. 
 123. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 36 and 38 and accompanying text. 
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argued that the threshold has not met its primary purpose of helping 
produce more stable governments. 
The AKP itself proposed a system whereby 450 of the deputies in 
parliament would be elected by the current process, and the remaining 100 
deputies would be ―Turkey Deputies‖ that would be elected on the basis of 
percentage of national vote for parties.
125
 One percent nationally would 
equate to one seat in parliament, and these deputies would not be subject 
to the 10% threshold.
126
 In essence, this would mean that the 10% 
threshold would apply to 450 deputies, and the remaining 100 would be 
subject only to a 1% national threshold. This solution, unfortunately, still 
keeps representation for parties polling under 10% at well below the level 
of representation that would adequately represent their percentage of the 
vote.
127
 That is why the Turkey Deputy idea was suggested in addition to a 
reduction of the threshold to 5%.
128
 There are concerns, however, that the 
Turkey Deputy system could serve to divide parliament in two, and do 
more harm than good.
129
 In addition, the Constitutional Court may be a 
barrier to this system, as it has overturned a similar proposal in the past.
130
 
 
 
 125.  
Following Parliament Speaker Köksal Toptan‘s suggestion last Friday of establishment of 
four parliamentary commissions to draft a new Political Parties Law, which included 
lowering Turkey‘s much-criticized 10 percent election threshold, the government has 
suggested that 100 deputies in the 550-seat Turkish Parliament be elected as ―Turkey 
deputies‖ to provide fair representation of parties. 
Yavuz, supra note 74. 
 126.  
According to the AK Party‘s proposal—which was also included in the draft constitution 
prepared by a group of constitutional law experts led by Professor Ergun Özbudun last year—
these 100 deputies will be elected according to the percentage of the vote parties receive. For 
example, a party that received 50 percent of the nationwide vote will have 50 Turkey 
deputies, while a party that received 1 percent vote will receive one Turkey deputy. 
Id. 
 127. For example, a party polling at six percent would have six representatives out of a legislature 
of 550. This is a mere 1.09% of the legislature. If the threshold were just lowered to five percent that 
party would probably receive about 33 seats. 
 128.  
AK Party officials [said] that even if the election threshold were reduced to 5 percent, a party 
that garners 4.9 percent of the nationwide vote would still not be able to have representation 
in Parliament. They said lowering the election threshold needs to be accompanied by the 
―Turkey deputy‖ system, which makes it possible for parties to be represented in Parliament 
even if they fail to pass the election threshold. The AK Party wants the new method of 
election to go into effect in the next general elections scheduled for July 22, 2011, and will  
reportedly try to convince opposition parties to back the proposal. 
Yavuz, supra note 74. 
 129.  
[O]pposition parties have taken different stances regarding the AK Party‘s proposal. The CHP 
thinks this new deputy election system will divide Parliament into two while the MHP, 
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Another possible solution would be to allow regional or minority 
parties, the chief victims of the threshold, to either be exempted from the 
national threshold or be subject to a lowered threshold. This idea is similar 
to the Polish electoral system, where ethnic minority parties do not have to 
surpass the threshold.
131
 This would allow Turkey to ensure that only the 
most relevant national parties would be elected to the Grand National 
Assembly, while also allowing representation for important regional and 
minority interests.
132
 There could, however, be some confusion on what 
constitutes a ―regional‖ or a ―minority‖ party. In addition, this proposal 
may conflict with the Turkish Constitution, which states that ―[m]embers 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly represent, not merely their own 
constituencies or constituents, but the Nation as a whole.‖133 Though no 
such proposal has been put before the Turkish courts, it is possible that the 
courts could interpret this constitutional language as a prohibition of such 
an exception that would put regional or minority interests on equal footing 
with national interests. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While there are many creative solutions which would increase the 
representativeness of Turkey‘s electoral system, in this case the simplest 
solution is the best. Rather than a complicated system consisting of 
―Turkey Deputies‖ or separate requirements for minority parties, Turkey 
should simply lower its threshold to 5% for two primary reasons. First, 
this would bring Turkey in line with European norms and democratic 
principles.
134
 Second, the purpose of proportional representation is to 
maximize the correlation between representation and the voters.
135
 The 
 
 
sharing the same concerns, says the election threshold should be lowered, either to 7 or 8 
percent. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) says it is ready to support any 
attempt to lower the election threshold, adding that it could negotiate on the ―Turkey deputy‖ 
system. 
Id. 
 130. ―This method of election of deputies was first proposed in 1995 by the late President Turgut 
Özal and former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who was also former leader of the True Path Party 
(DYP); however, the relevant amendments were cancelled by the Constitutional Court soon after they 
were implemented.‖ Id. 
 131. Zimbron, supra note 23, at 18. In general, Poland operates a five percent national threshold. 
This system allows representation for ethnic minority parties who are unable to surpass the five 
percent threshold, thereby encouraging the representation of minorities in the legislature. 
 132. A system like this would also allow parties to make a decision on whether to focus on issues 
of national importance or on issues which directly affect a certain region or minority. 
 133. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi art. 80. 
 134. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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only ―wasted‖ votes in parliamentary systems are those cast for parties 
failing to meet the electoral threshold.
136
 Therefore, minimizing these 
votes by reducing the threshold is the most effective way to make 
government more representative. A threshold of 5% would also be low 
enough that important minority and regional parties could obtain 
representation without having to resort to legal loopholes. 
In the end, this issue comes down to that voter in Şırnak who, along 
with most of his neighbors and peers, was represented by politicians who 
did not win his vote, along with the millions of voters who saw their 
legislature skewed by the effects of this extraordinarily high threshold. A 
party that 65% of voters did not vote for ended up with 66% of the seats in 
Turkey‘s parliament.137 The voters of an EU candidate country expect 
more, and it is time for Turkey to deliver on the promise of fundamental 
rights contained in its constitution.
138
 ―Seçim barajı,‖ the Turkish phrase 
for the electoral threshold, literally means ―election barrier.‖ It is aptly 
named, not only because the threshold serves as a barrier through which 
parties must pass to enter government, but also because the threshold 
serves as a barrier between the current Turkish democracy in the shadow 
of a military coup and a democracy that reformists believe Turkey 
deserves.  
Sinan Alkin  
 
 
 136.  
The number of ‗wasted votes‘—in other words votes which do not go towards electing any 
candidates—is very small. Only votes for those candidates who fail to reach the threshold can 
be said to be wasted. This helps to reaffirm to voters that their participation will more than 
likely ‗make a difference.‘ 
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH & DOCUMENTATION, supra note 31. 
 137. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi art. 5 (―The fundamental aims and duties of the state are 
. . . to strive for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the 
social state governed by the rule of law.‖). 
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